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NOTES AND COMMENT
ferred but rather the right to remove them is.39 Since the right to
remove was lost by the act of the city, the tenant must be compen-
sated for the interest he would otherwise have had.40
Although the tenant is legally and equitably entitled to compen-
sation, a disregard of the distinction between personal and real prop-
erty would simplify and clarify the problem. Why not regard all
condemned property as merely property and not as personalty or
realty? Why not settle all disputes in such matters on principles of
equity and justice unhampered by such classification and thus remove
uncertainty, confusion, and conflict?
PHILIP A. LIMPERT.
ENFORCEMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE COVENANTS IN PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS BY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION.
Decisions on pleas for injunctions to specifically enforce con-
tracts of personal services are excellent examples of the discretionary
power of a court of equity. When these services are unique, special
or extraordinary on the part of the defendant, it is plain that the
principle on which equity's jurisdiction rests is the same as that
which applies to agreements for the purchase of lands, or of chattels
having a unique character and value. The damages for the breach
of such contracts cannot be estimated with any degree of certainty,
and the employer cannot, by means of any compensation, purchase
the same services in the labor market.' But at first equity refused
to enforce any contracts, irrespective of the inadequacy of damages,
if they involved a continuing breach. The courts took the position
that contracts which required varied and continuous acts would not
be specifically enforced, because a decree in such cases would entail a
continuous supervision, by the officers of the court, of the acts done
by the defendant pursuant to the decree.2  Gradually, however, the
So. Baltimore Co. v. Muhlbach, 69 Md. 395, 16 Atl. 117 (1888); (sale
of buildings erected by tenant is not an interest in land; not within Stat. of
Frauds).
'In re Matter of Buffalo, supra note 6 at 376: "The City loses nothing; it
simply forces the tenant to sell and steps into place and when it has extin-
guished both titles it has nothing but land, such property as the statute conterm-
plates shall be taken."
'POM ROY, SPECIFIc PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) §24.
'Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366 (1874) ; Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-
Cooper, 157 N. Y. 60, 51 N. E. 408 (1898). POMEROY, supra note 1. §22: "As
a general proposition, contracts which provide for the personal affirmative acts,
or the personal services of the parties, are not specifically enforced in equity,
not because the legal remedy of damages is always sufficiently certain and
adequate, but because the courts do not possess the means and ability of
enforcing their decrees, which would necessarily be very special, and of com-
pelling the performance which constitutes the equitable remedy."
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courts relaxed the strictness of this rule; and, based on the theory of
public welfare, issued mandatory injunctions ordering public service
companies to provide water and gas; ordered specific performance of
a contract where one railroad had agreed to permit another to use
its tracks.3 Contracts to repair and build were refused enforcement
because of this same objection-that equity has no means of enforcing
or continuously supervising its decree. But experience in the results
from a public service type of contract showed that this objection, set
up by the court, did not in fact materialize; and now the rule in New
York is settled, that as regards building contracts for the breach of
which damages would be an inadequate remedy, equity will decree
specific performance by mandatory injunction.4
Contracts for personal service, however, present an essentially
different situation. Pomeroy says,5 "contracts for personal services
where the acts stipulated for require special knowledge, skill, ability,
experience, or the exercise of judicial discretion, integrity and like
personal qualities on the part of the employees or wherever the full
performance, according to the spirit of the agreement, rests on the
individual will of the contracting party, courts of equity have no
direct and efficient means of affirmatively compelling a specific execu-
tion; * * * such contracts may, however, according to the doctrine
now universally established in the English equity courts, be negatively
enforced by injunction whether they contain express negative stipu-
lations or not." Where the subject of the contract is to build an arch
under a railroad, equity can enforce the contract by issuing a decree
that said railroad build the arch; 6 but if the subject of the contract is
that one man is to be the servant of another, and he refuses, the best
equity can say to him is that he may not work for any other. No
court can control the will of an individual; the most it can do is to
attempt to persuade him to carry out his contract with the plaintiff by
prohibiting him from performing similar services for his own benefit
or for anyone else. In accordance with the general doctrine of the
refusal of equity to decree continuing acts there are some early cases
denying the right to specific performance of contracts of service
because an injunction would necessitate too great supervision; 7
although as early as 1812, in a case where the articles of agreement
in a partnership contained a stipulation to the effect that all the efforts
'Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper, supra note 2; Strauss v. Estates
of Long Beach, 187 App. Div. 876, 176 N. Y. Supp. 447 (2d Dept. 1919).
POMEROY, supra note 1, footnote (a) : "An important growth in the field of
equity jurisprudence, has been the extensive use of injunctions against the
breach of ndgative agreements, both express and implied, and this is, in effect,
enforcing specific performance."
IP. P. & C. I. R. R. Co. v. C. I. & B. R. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 152, 32 N. E.
17, 26 L. R. A. 610 (1894) ; Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach, supra note 3;
Lawrence v. Saratoga Lake Ry. Co., 36 Hun 467 (N. Y. 1885).
r POMEROY, supra note 1, §310.
6 p. p. & C. I. R. R. Co. v. C. I. & B. R. R. Co., supra note 4.
73 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) §1423; Clarke v. Price, 2 Wil. Ch. 157(1819); Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333 (1829).
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of both partners in business similar to that of the concern should
accrue to the benefit of the partnership, a decree was issued prohibit-
ing one of the members carrying on in his own behalf.8 So that over
a century ago there was a certain element of confusion as to the
power of equity to decree specific performance of contracts for per-
sonal services; the courts holding that as a general rule, to enforce
service from an unwilling defendant would do more harm than good,
but that certain instances are exceptions and from the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case, justice might best be done through
just such a decree.
In Lumley v. Wagner9 Lord St. Leonards, after an exhaustive
review of all the cases up to that time, granted a decree prohibiting
an opera singer from appearing at any other theatre during the term
of her contract with the plaintiff. In this instance, the contract
involved contained the stipulation that the defendant would not
appear elsewhere. His Lordship realized that the decree prohibiting
other appearances would in fact result in the defendant carrying out
her entire contract, and actually performing for the plaintiff, although
he based his decree on her express covenant that she would not per-
form at any other theatre.'0 "Wherever this court has not proper
jurisdiction to enforce specific performance, it operates to bind men's
consciences, as far as they can be bound, to a true and literal per-
formance of their agreements; tnd it will not suffer them to depart
from their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party with whom
they contracted to the mere chance of any damages which a jury
might give." Had his Lordship merely given us this thought, and
let it suffice we should probably have had less conflict on this phase
of the law. However, in further discussing his opinion, he says,
" * * * and I may at once declare that if I had only to deal with the
affirmative covenant of the defendant, J. Wagner, that she would
perform at her Majesty's theatre, I should not have granted an
injunction." It is difficult to understand why his Lordship insisted
on the existence of a negative covenant in the contract as a test of its
enforceability, when he recognized that a decree ordering perform-
ance of the negative in fact enforces the positive element of the con-
tract, and he expressly reversed Vice-Chancellor Shadwell in a case
precisely similar," where the objection to granting an injunction was
that it would enforce the affirmative covenant. His Lordship took
the position that the affirmative covenant creates a right worthy of
enforcement, but beyond the reach of a court of equity; and that the
negative covenant in the contract is essential as a basis on which the
court may act.
'Morriss v. Colman, 18 Ves. 437 (1812).
1 1 De G. McN. & G. 604 (1852).
10 "It is true, that I have not the means of compelling her to sing, but she
has no cause of complaint if I compel her to abstain from the commission of an
act which she has bound herself not to do, and thus possibly cause her to fulfill
her enqageinent." (Italics ours.)
"Kemble v. Kean, supra note 7.
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Twenty years later Sir R. Malins, Vice-Chancellor, extended
this doctrine.. 2 He granted an injunction restraining the defendant
actor from appearances other than at the plaintiff's theatre in a case
where there was no negative clause in the contract of service. Citing
Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood's interpretation of Lord St.
Leonard's opinion,13 "he fully adopts there the principle that it is not
necessary to have a negative covenant in order to prevent perform-
ance at another theatre," and, relying on the decision in Webster v.
Dillon, the learned Vice-Chancellor disregarded the necessity of an
express negative stipulation, ruling that one may be implied from the
positive covenant. "It appears to me, on the plainest ground, that
an engagement to perform for nine months at theatre A is a contract
not to perform at theatre B or at any other theatre whatsoever." So
that the learned Vice-Chancellor, while going a step forward from
Lord St. Leonard's express negative as a basis for a decree in equity,
nevertheless insists on the existence of an implied negative covenant
by which the court of equity may lay hold of the entire contract, and,
by enforcing the unwritten, bind the parties to a performance of
their mutual duties.
The fallacy of this argument is recognized by Lindley, L. J., and
the rule expressly reversed, in Whitwood Chemical Company v.
Hardman.14 The Lord Justice objects that, although at the time he
enters the contract the defendant may be ready to work for the
plaintiff, this does not mean he agrees not to work for another. Thus
a leading actor might conceivably agree to perform every night in the
week, and for the entire season, for a given producer; but this does
not necessarily imply that he would be willing to forego the chance
of possible remuneration that matinees and midnight performances
could bring him; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that a producer
might agree to such side performances, if it were on such grounds
only that he could induce one with a tremendous drawing power to
become affiliated with his cast. But this agreement for the benefit of
the employee should not make the contract unenforceable. In such
a case there cannot be a negative covenant not to work for anyone
else because there is express permission that the employee may do
precisely this. Therefore the employer would be without remedy be-
cause of the provision aiding the employee. In the above case,' 5
the contract on which suit was based contained the agreement
that the defendant would give the whole of his time to the
company's business, but there was no negative stipulation that
he would not work for anyone else. The lower court granted
an injunction restraining the defendant from giving less than
'Montague v. Flocton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189 (1873).
"Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. B:) 432; defendant actor agreed that he
would perform at Sadler's theatre for twelve successive nights. There was no
argument on the part of the defendant. Restraining injunction granted without
a negative covenant.
I L. R. 2 Ch. 416 (1891).
5Ibid.
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the whole of his time to the company's business. Lord Justice
Lindley vacated the injunction on the ground of absence of a
negative stipulation in the contract. He based his decision on the
fact that such a clause would indicate some particular and specific
agreement, and that, due to its absence, "there is nothing [in the
contract] that shows anything definite was in the minds of these
parties beyond this-that the defendant was to give the whole of his
time to the plaintiff's business." But, in fact, the injunction granted
here by the lower court was unconscionable because it restrained the
defendant from giving less tian the whole of his time to the com-
pany's business. The decree should have been overruled, even if it
had been an attempt to enforce a negative covenant in the contract.
Because of His Lordship's remarks, even though the injunction he
vacated was unconscionable, this case has been followed in the Eng-
lish courts as standing squarely for the proposition that an injunction
will not lie, prohibiting one from engaging in the same type of per-
sonal service with a stranger to the contract, unless such contract
contains a negative stipulation specifically excluding such action.
In fact, then, this creates as the test of enforceability of personal
service contracts the presence of a negative stipulation. The reason
for this is the principle, discernible throughout the opinions, and
noted by Pomeroy,' 6 that courts of equity will not order a specific
performance of a positive covenant because they have no means to
enforce such decree should they issue one; "and for this reason,
rather than from any inherent and absolute impossibility, equity
refuses to exercise its jurisdiction" 17 over purely affirmative contracts.
Yet many authorities are opposed to this strict rule of the abso-
lute necessity of express, negative covenants in a contract of personal
services.
Dean Pound thinks Is in certain instances this objection is largely
theoretical, and he recognizes that there is a distinction between
decreeing specific performance of a contract and enforcing the con-
tract by specific relief. He seems in favor of the proposition that in
a situation where a negative stipulation in a contract can be enforced
directly a contract possessing only the affirmative clause, can be
indirectly enforced by a prohibitory injunction. It is also true that
(as many old English cases hold) due to the particular facts and
circumstances, granting a prohibitory injunction would be destructive,
and would inevitably lead to much harm. Then, even with an express
negative covenant in the contract, an injunction will not lie. But
' POMEROY, supra note 1, §303. "This species of impracticability in grant-
ing the equitable remedy * * * assumes * * * that, through want of appropriate
means and instruments, the court is unable, while pursuing its ordinary methods
of administering justice, either to render a decree or to enforce the decree which
it should make. and thus compel a specific performance of his agreement by
the defendant."
IT Ibid. §307.
See Pound, The Progress of the Law, Equity (1918-19) 33 HARv. L.
REv. 439.
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these same instances tend to defeat the theory that the test for
enforceability of contracts of personal services is the mere presence
or absence of a negative stipulation. Equity, exercising its discretion,
has thus refused its aid.19  In Collins V. Plumb 20 the court declined
to exercise its power of preventing the commission of an act because
such power could not be properly and beneficially exercised; and in
Ehrman v. Bartholomew, where the court says,21 "in my opinion such
a stipulation ought not be enforced; to enforce such a general
negative stipulation as I find here would be, in my opinion, a danger-
ous extension, for the stipulation extends to business of any kind";
again in Herbert Morris L. D. T. v. Saxelby,2 2 the court declined to
grant an injunction against the defendant because it regarded the
terms of the contract as unconscionable; and in Lawrence v. Dixie,23
the court refused an application for equitable relief because, "the
plaintiff is not specially bound by the contract so that the obligations
are reciprocal and enforceable." Here we have instances where even
with an express negative stipulation equity looked to the feasibility
of granting an injunction. It was not a question of power to decree;
but rather for equity to determine the practicability of the resulting
injunction. Would an order serve the purpose of the plaintiff, or
would it merely result in hardship to all concerned? And where, in
equity's discretion an injunction was not practical, the presence of a
negative covenant did not force the court to grant a decree. Con-
versely then, why should the absence of a negative covenant prevent
" Clarke v. Price, 2 Wil. Ch. 157 (1819) ; Kemble v. Kean, supra note 7;
Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, L. R. 2 Ch. 57 (1915). In the latter case,
the court thought a contract for personal services unconscionable and refused
to enforce it, because the defendant, who had worked in plaintiff's employ since
he was fifteen years old, had been forced to enter into this contract of service
immediately on reaching his majority. In Hepworth Manufacturing Co. v.
Ryott, L. R. 1 Ch. 1 (1920), the stipulation of a movie star, acting under an
assumed name, that he would not use this assumed name for any purpose what-
soever was deemed by the court to be tyrannous, oppressive, and unreasonable,
and so not such a contract as the court would enforce.
' 16 Ves. 454 (1810). "Covenant not to sell water to the prejudice of the
plaintiffs, was not enforced by Lord Eldon, not because he had any doubt about
the jurisdiction of the court (for on that point he had no doubt), but because it
was impossible to ascertain every time the water was supplied by the defendants
whether it was or not to the damage of the plaintiffs." (Quoted in Lumley v.
Wagner, supra note 9, by Lord St. Leonards.)
L. R. 1 Ch. 671 (1898). In this case the contract read: "* * * shall
diligently employ himself for the purpose of selling the firm's goods * * *, to
find new customers and to extend business, and shall devote the whole of his
time during business hours in the transaction of the business of the firm, and
shall not in any manner directly or indirectly employ himself in any other
business * * * during the term of the agreement." The court refused an
injunction because it would work great harm to the defendant and the plaintiff
had an action at law for damages; since it did not appear that the services of
the defendant were unique and special. (Italics ours.)
119 App. Div. 295, 104 N. Y. Supp. 516 (1st Dept. 1909).
L. R. 2 Ch. 57 (1915).
NOTES AND COMMENT
a decree? 24 The old theory was that a court would not order one
man to become the servant of another. This because it had no way
of enforcing its decree.2 5 Such is the fundamental principle. Cases
have repeatedly so held .2  But a right exists, arising from the posi-
tive covenant in the contract. And a prohibitory injunction, in effect,
enforces it.27  So why not exercise the indirect where the direct is
impractical? To order an actor not to work for anyone else for the
term of his contract results in his working for the plaintiff. From
the nature of the case it may be determined whether or not specific
relief is practical; and such possibility should be the deciding factor.
In New York, the courts have followed this line of reasoning,
rather than the stricter English rule. Duff v. Russell 28 is a leading
New York case on the point. There the defendant had agreed to
appear for two years on the plaintiff's circuit; and, relying on this
contract, plaintiff had spent much money in extensively advertising
defendant in many sections of the country, outfitting an entire case,
leasing theatres, etc. An injunction was brought, to restrain her
from appearing at any other theatre, although there was not a nega-
tive clause in the contract. The opinion stated, "the court is bound
to look to the substance, and not to the form of the contract. As the
defendant had agreed to appear in seven performances each week
' POMEROY, supra note 1, §24. "Where one person agrees to render per-
sonal services to another (requiring special skill and ability), so that, in case
of default, the same services could not easily be obtained from others, although
the affirmative specific performance of the contract is beyond the power of the
court, its performance will be negatively enforced by enjoining its breach."(Italics ours.)
'Ibid. §307: "The jurisdiction is declined not because it is impossible to
formulate a decree which shall order everything necessary for a complete
performance, nor even because a compulsory execution of mch decree is abso-
lutely and in the nature of things impossible; but because the enforcement of
the decree would unreasonably tax the time of the court, and thereby interfere
too much with its public duties toward other suitors, and in the general admin-
istration of justice." (Italics ours.)
' Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, szpra note 14. "The principle is
that the court does not decree specific performance of contracts for personal
service, and the question is whether there is anything in this case which takes it
out of the principle." Win. Robinson & Co. Ltd., v. Haur, L. R. (1898) 2 Ch.
451, where the court did grant an injunction restraining defendant from carry-
ing on or engaging in, as principal, servant, or agent, any trade relating to goods
manufactured or sold by plaintiff. There the court exacted a promise from
plaintiff not to exercise its option to compel the defendant to work for five more
years after the term of the contract, and refused to allow the clause in the
negative stipulation prohibiting defendant to engage in any other business. All
this, based on the principle that "this court never will enforce an agreement by
which one person undertakes to be the servant of another"; and the court,
realizing that the effect of the injunction would be to compel the defendant to
work for the plaintiff, was very reluctant in granting it.
' POMEROY, supra note 1, §22. "Wherever from the nature of the agree-
ment. the difficulty in the way of granting relief does not exist, or can be
obviated, the principles and rules of specific performance apply to contracts
which stipulate for personal acts or omissions, as well as to those whose subject-
matter is real or personal property."
14 N. Y. Supp. 134, aff'd, 133 N. Y. 678, 31 N. E. 622 (1891).
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(exclusive of Sundays) which the plaintiff's company might give in
New York, it was not possible for her to perform elsewhere in New
York without a violation of her contract with the plaintiff, and a
negative clause was unnecessary to secure to the plaintiff exclusively
the services of the defendant." In Hoyt v. Fuller2D where the
services performed by the defendant were special, unique, and extra-
ordinary, in that she had invented an attractive specialty known as
the "Serpentine Dance" and through which act she had gained a
great reputation, the court again dispensed with the necessity of an
express negative covenant. Based on the contract for services, to
run "not exceeding August 1, 1892," the court granted an injunction
prohibiting other appearances. "The contract was intended to give
the plaintiffs, not the divided, but the exclusive, services of the
defendant, and where that is apparent a negative clause is unnecessary
to secure the result."
. Clearly, the court recognized a right arising out of the contract
in these cases. But the agreement must be certain and definite as to
the obligations imposed on the other party to the contract, before the
court should imply an obligation by injunction.30 However, when the
contract is conscionable, a right arises from the defendant's positive
covenant; and, though in England the stricter rule prevails, in New
York if there is the possibility of enforcing this right in personam by
injunction, our courts will decree one.
LAWRENCE T. GREssER, JR.
CORPORATIONS-JURISDIC.TION-INTERFERENCE WITHE THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A CORPORATION.
Despite the fact that Section 224 of the General Corporation
Law provides that an action against a foreign corporation may be
' 19 N. Y. Supp. 962 (1892).
'Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922). "What equity
exacts today as a condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if ren-
dered, will operate without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or to
defendant"; Lawrence v. Dixey, 104 N. Y. Supp. 516 (1907), where there was
no positive arrangement between the parties as to the subsequent seasons, or the
salary of the defendant, the court considered an injunction inequitable. "But
whether or not a court of equity will grant equitable relief in an action of this
character is always addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and could
never be enforced unless the parties seeking to enforce it are specifically bound
by the contract, so that there are enforceable reciprocal obligations, which are
definite and enforceable; Harry Hastings Attractions v. Howard, 119 Misc.
Rep. 326, 196 N. Y. Supp. 228 (1922), where the defendant took the leading
role in a burlesque performance, and his ability was such that his services were
unique, special, and extraordinary, he was enjoined from performing for any
person other than the plaintiff during the term of his contract. "The situation
here warrants the intervention of the court."
